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Abstract
We consider a stylized model of content contribution in a peer-to-peer network. The model
is appealing because it allows for linear-quadratic payoﬀ functions and for very general inter-
action patterns among agents. We ask: How do diﬀerent link patterns aﬀect contributions?
How are contributions aﬀected by whether these goods are strategic complements, substitutes,
or something in between? Who contributes and who free rides? How is the computational
complexity of optimal play aﬀected by the externalities of the game? What networks optimize
social contributions and social welfare? And how does the worst-case equilibrium performance
of a network compare to its best-case performance? The analysis ﬁnds that Nash equilibria
of this game always exist and that they are computable by solving a linear complementarity
problem. The equilibrium is unique when goods are strategic complements or weak substitutes
and contributions are proportional to a network centrality measure called the Bonacich index.
In the case of public goods, the equilibrium is non-unique and for every network there is an
equilibrium where some individuals contribute optimally and others completely free-ride. More-
over, these equilibria with complete free-riders and optimal contributors are the only candidate
stable equilibria are are characterized by k-order maximal independent sets. We ﬁnd that the
structure of optimal networks is hub-like when the game exhibits strict or weak complements.
Under public good scenarios, while hub-like networks remain optimal in the best case, they
also yield the worst-performing equilibria. Finally, we discuss two network-based policies for
improving the equilibrium performance of networks.
1 Introduction
Peer eﬀects, or the dependence of individual outcomes on group behaviour, is a characterizing
feature of peer-to-peer systems (Antoniadis et al. 2005). File-sharing systems, for example, rely on
participants to provision the network with content. Participants can experience a marginal increase
or decrease in utility from the kind of content contributed by others. We call such goods strategic
complements and strategic substitutes, respectively. Complementary goods may refer to missing
portions of a ﬁle sought be a user or simply to diverse and desirable content. Substitutable goods
refer to ﬁle contributions that duplicate, if only approximately so, a user’s own contributions.
Furthermore, in many peer-to-peer systems (as in BitTorrent, Tribler, Kazaa) the proximity of
peer-provisioned content impacts the extent to which it is accessible by a given participant. This
may be either because of the congestion and resulting latency along multi-hop connections (as in
BitTorrent) or because persons have only a partial view of the network (as in Kazaa).
Following Ballester et al. (2005), we adopt a simple model for a contribution game in this paper.
The model allows for positive and negative bilateral inﬂuences, meaning two players can positively
or negatively aﬀect each other’s payoﬀs.
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the contribution by other players. The utility structure provides for an individualized component,
refelecting decreasing marginal-returns for a player’s own contribution, in addition to a term that
reﬂects local interaction that varies across pairs of players, meaning pairs of players can aﬀect each
other diﬀerently.
The population-wide pattern of these local complementarities or substitutabilities is well-captured
by a network. In the case of a peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing system, this network closely resembles the
underlying network of connectivity between peers and the local complementarities or substitutabil-
ities reﬂect the payoﬀ interdependencies rooted in this network structure of player links. In such a
setting, equilibrium strategies naturally reﬂect players’ network embeddedness.
The model is appealing because a unique Nash equilibrium of the contribution game can be
readily computed as a metric of network centrality when the network exhibits complementarities.
This facilitates a rich empirical analysis of the contribution game under this scenario. First proposed
by Bonacich (1987) nearly two decades ago, the Bonacich network centrality measure counts the
number of all paths emanating from a given node weighted by a decay factor that decreases with the
length of these paths.1 As demonstrated by Ballester et al. (2005) this turns out to be intimately
related to equilibrium behavior in our setting, since the paths capture all possible feedbacks from
others’ play. The decay factor represents the extent to which others’ actions enter into a player’s
own action’s payoﬀ. We also ﬁnd that Nash equilibria are always (even when they are non-unique)
computable by solving a linear complementarity problem. In the case of public goods, while the
equilibria can be non-unique, we ﬁnd that equilibria where players either contribute completely
or free-ride completely are the only candidate-stable equilibria are are characterized by k-order
maximal independent sets. In the case of public goods (equivalently strongly substitutable goods),
equilibria are non-unique and involve free-riding, i.e. some users not contributing at all to network-
available content. In such cases, we ﬁnd that equilibria where players either contribute optimally
or free-ride completely are the only candidate-stable equilibria, and that these are characterized by
k-order maximal independent sets.
We consider the problems of designing network that maximize aggregate contribution and wel-
fare, and ﬁnd that the structure of optimal networks is hub-like when the game exhibits strict or
weak complements. Under public good scenarios, while hub-like networks remain optimal in the
best case, they also yield the worst-performing equilibria. We discuss two network-based policies
aimed at improving the equilibrium performance of networks: the removal of a single key player and
the reorganization of network links. Removing the key player yields dramatic improvements to the
worst-case performance of a graph and can completely reconcile best- and worst-case performance
in suﬃciently sparse graphs. We show that the eﬃcaciousness of the link-reorganization policy
scales as O(
√
e) with respect to the performance of completely random graphs with given v,e, and
decreases as graphs become larger and denser.
1.1 Related Work
This paper situates itself in a growing body of literature interested in games where endogenous play
is susceptible to externalities manifested across network links. Demange (2006), Kung (2005), and
Bramoulle and Kranton (2006) equilibrium proﬁles in a game with public good (substitutable good)
provisioning. Our model deals with a diﬀerent payoﬀ structure and allows for externalities to be
either complementary or substitutable. Moreover, Kung’s model deals with cooperative coalition
1It was originally interpreted as an index of inﬂuence or power of the actors of a social network. Katz (1953) is a
seminal reference.formation in the core, whereas our model is non-cooperative, so that we use the Nash equilibrium
as our solution concept.
One of the main points of concern in the network games literature is the tension between stability
and eﬃciency. See Jackson (2005) for a survey of the area. Johari et al. (2005) and Roughgarden
(2004) investigate the eﬀects of network architecture on the worst-case eﬃciency (otherwise the price
of anarchy) of equilibria in routing games. Jackson et al. (2005) and Anshelevich et al. (2004)
study the best-case eﬃciency (otherwise the price of stability) of equilibria in network formation
games. We provide a partial characterization of equilibria in our game and relate a network’s
eﬃciency, in both the best and worst case, to its geometric properties.
Our contribution game is based on work that investigates how individuals provision content in
the face of the externalities from other individuals’ contribution. Our model is based on a model
by Ballester et al. (2005) but where players only face uniformly positive or negative bilateral
externalities and marginally decreasing returns in their own contribution. This stylized model
captures many natural settings; speciﬁcally, it is a good model of content provisioning in peer-to-
peer ﬁle-sharing systems. Ballester al. do not focus on the relative eﬃciency of diﬀerent network
topologies, and much of the analysis in this paper, even the characterization of corner equilibria in
terms of k-maximal independent sets, can be adapted to their model.
Finally, Kempe et al. (2003) investigate how the topology of a social network aﬀects the
propagation of ideas and formulate the problem of how best to maximize the spread of inﬂuence for
a given network. Taking the view that social networks are endogenously optimizing some feature,
Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg (2003) concern themselves with how to predict which links will form as
the network evolves. We study a setting where agents freely interact and study how the pattern of
interactions aﬀects the optimality of observed outcomes. We study two network-based intervention
policies to improve the equilibrium performance of graphs.
2 The Model
2.1 The game
Let G(v,e) denote the set of undirected and unweighted connected graphs without loops with v
vertices and e edges. Connectedness requires that e ≥ v − 1, which we assume from now on.
Players are connected by a network g ∈ G(v,e) with adjacency matrix G = [gij]. This is a zero
diagonal and non-negative square matrix, with gij ∈ {0,1} for all i  = j.
Each player i = 1,...,n selects a contribution xi ≥ 0, and gets a payoﬀ ui(x1,...,xn). We focus
on bilinear utility functions of the form:
ui(x,g) = xi −
1
2
x2
i + a
n X
j=1
gijxixj, (1)
where x = (x1,...,xn).
Note that this utility is marginal-decreasing in an agent’s own contribution, with ∂2ui
∂x2
i
= −1.
The external eﬀect of another agent on the utility of agent i is captured by the cross-derivatives
∂2ui
∂xixj = agij, for i  = j. When a > 0, the eﬀect on agent i of agent j’s contribution is marginal-
increasing if and only if i and j are connected in g; when a < 0, the eﬀect is marginal-decreasing.
The network g reﬂects the pattern of existing payoﬀ (relative) complementarities (when a is posi-
tive) and substitutabilities (when a is negative) across all pairs of players.
Where convenient, we use Σ to refer to the n-player game with payoﬀs given by Equation 1 and
strategy space, the positive real line.2.2 The Linear Complementarity Problem
We analyze the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game introduced above. We note that
an equilibrium exists if and only if the following holds:
∂ui
∂xi
(x∗) = 0, ∀i ∈ Nsuch that x∗
i > 0 (2)
∂ui
∂xi
(x∗) < 0, ∀i ∈ Nsuch that x∗
i = 0
In matrix notation, the above Nash equilibrium necessary and suﬃcient conditions in Equations
2 become:
x∗ >= 0, (3)
−a + Σx∗ >= 0,
−xt∗(−a + Σx∗) = 0.
The problem of ﬁnding a vector x∗ such that the above conditions hold is known as the linear
complementarity problem LCP(−a,−Σ) (Cottle 1993). We can therefore state the following:
Theorem 2.1. The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the contribution game with parameters
α and Σ are given by the set of solutions to LCP(−α,−Σ).
The linear complementarity problem is a well-studied problem and we borrow from this litera-
ture to address existence of the Nash equilibrium in our game, as well as in our empirical studies
to characterize optimally-designed networks.
In the next sections we study the current model under strict complementarities, when a > 0,
and under substitutabilities, when a < 0. The local interaction graph connecting agents becomes
irrelevent when a = 0, as the contribution levels of other agents does not impact an agent’s utility.
In this case, the network-independent optimal contribution level for each agent is 1.
Example 2.2. To ﬁx ideas, Figure 1 illustrates how contribution levels and utilities of all nodes
vary with parameter a on an arbitrary graph g. The graph g, is a 12-vertex regular graph depicted
in Figure 2 later in the paper. The plot shows the contribution levels of all nodes at all equilibria,
which have been exhaustively enumerated. All equilibria are superimposed on the graph once, not
counting isomorphisms.
The plots illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria under the pure public good scenario, when a
is negative below some threshold less than 0. When a < 0, we will characterize this threshold and
distinguish between pure public goods, (when a is less than this threshold), and show that hidden
complementarities exist above this threshold. The plots also show that above this threshold, when
complementarities, hidden or otherwise, exist, the equilibrium is unique and the contribution levels
are interior, i.e. xi > 0 for all nodes in the graph. The plots also point to the network-independent
optimum contribution level (of 1) persisting for some nodes even when substitutabilities are very
large. We will show that this is always the case for all graphs. We also note that intermediate
contribution levels, i.e. 0 < xi < 1, become less prevalent as a becomes more negative. We will
show that equilibria characterized by such contribution levels, which we call partially-corner, are
not stable to a perturbed best-response dynamic.Figure 1: The plots show the individual contributions (left) and utilities (right) of all nodes on the graph
g (shown in Figure 4.2), as a function of a. Along with the graph g, a determines how the externalities of
other nodes’ play is felt by each agent.
3 Complementary Goods
We ﬁrst study the game under local complementarities, when a > 0. Before turning to the equi-
librium analysis, we deﬁne a network centrality measure due to Philip Bonacich (1987) that proves
useful for this analysis.
3.1 The Bonacich network centrality measure
Let g ∈ G(v,e) and, as before, let G denote its adjacency matrix. This is a v−square, symmetric,
and zero diagonal (0,1)−matrix. Denote by λ1(g) its largest eigenvalue, also called the index of g.
Note that this index is always well-deﬁned and λ1(g) > 0.
Lemma 3.1. Let a > 0. The matrix B(g,a) = [I−aG]
−1 is well-deﬁned and non-negative if and
only if aλ1(G) < 1. Then, B(g,a) =
P+∞
k=0 akGk, and its coeﬃcients bij(g,a) count the number of
paths in g starting at i and ending at j, where paths of length k are weighted by ak.
Proof. From Theorem III∗, page 601 in Debreu and Herstein (1953).
Deﬁnition 3.2. Suppose that aλ1(G) < 1. The vector of Bonacich centralities of parameter a in
g is b(g,a) = B(g,a)   1.
The Bonacich (1987) centrality of node i is bi(g,a) =
P
j bij(g,a), and counts the total number
of weighted paths in g starting from i.
Theorem 3.3. For aλ1(G) < 1, the game Σ has a unique Nash equilibrium x∗(Σ), which is interior
and given by
x∗(Σ) = b(g,a) (4)
Proof. From Theorem I in Ballester et al. (2005).
Corollary 3.4. The utility of player i at equilibrium is ui(x∗,g) = 1
2x∗
i
2 = 1
2bi(g,a)2.Proof.
ui(x∗,g) = x∗
i −
1
2
x∗2
i + a
n X
j=1
gijx∗
ix∗
j
= x∗
i(1 + a
n X
j=1
gijx∗
j) −
1
2
x∗2
i
for all i. By the ﬁrst order conditions ∂ui(x∗,g)/∂xi = 0 that yield the Nash equilibrium2 we have:
x∗
i = 1 + a
n X
j=1
gijx∗
j, for all i.
Replacing above gives:
ui(x∗,g) = x∗2
i −
1
2
x∗2
i =
1
2
x∗2
i =
1
2
bi(g,a)2.
Then the total equilibrium welfare u(x∗,g)   1 is 1
2  b(g,a) 
2 = 1
2b(g,a)   b(g,a). We remark
that the correspondence between the Bonacich centrality indices of a graph and its equilibrium when
a > 0 establishes uniqueness and interiority of equilibria when aλ1(G) < 1. It also establishes that
an equilibrium fails to exist when aλ1(G) > 1. Under the latter conditions, the positive feedback
from other agents’ contributions is too high and contributions increase without bound.
3.2 Comparative Statics
The previous results relate individual equilibrium outcomes to the Bonacich centrality in the net-
work g of local complementarities. The next result establishes a positive relationship between the
aggregate equilibrium outcome and the pattern of local complementarities. First we remark that
the cross eﬀects for the payoﬀ function given in Equation 1 is captured by the matrix Σ = −I+aG.
For any two matrices Σ and Σ′, we write Σ′ > Σ if σ′
ij > σij, for all i,j, with at least one strict
inequality.
Theorem 3.5. Let Σ and Σ′ symmetric such that Σ′ > Σ. If aλ1(G′) < 1 and aλ1(G) < 1 then
x∗(Σ′) > x∗(Σ).
Proof. Σ′ = Σ+aD, with dij ≥ 0 with at least one strict inequality. Theorem 1 holds so −Σx∗(Σ) =
Σ′x∗(Σ′) = 1, and x∗(Σ),x∗(Σ′) > 0. Now observe that −x∗t(Σ′)Σx∗(Σ) = x∗t(Σ′)1 = x∗(Σ′).
By symmetry of Σ′, we have: −x∗t(Σ′)Σx∗(Σ) = −x∗t(Σ′)Σ′x∗(Σ) + ax∗t(Σ′)Dx∗(Σ) = x(Σ) +
ax∗t(Σ′)Dx∗(Σ).
Each individual outcome increases with a and with G. Indeed, we are either increasing the
weight to each path, or increasing the number of such paths. Hence, both individual equilibrium
outcomes, aggregate equilibrium outcome and welfare increase with a and with G.
2Recall that this equilibrium is interior, so that these hold with equality.4 Substitutable Goods
When a < 0 we have a substitutability eﬀect between players’ contributions, i.e. we have a public
good game. We have shown that for all values of a, positive or negative, the equilibria of the
contribution game are given by the solutions to an associated LCP problem. We have seen that
when a > 0 an equilibrium to the game on the graph g fails to exist when a > 1/λ1(g). We remark
that an equilibrium always exists in a public good setting, i.e. there exists a Nash equilibrium
proﬁle for any network structure. It is easy to show that the best-response function is continuous
from the compact convex set {x ∈ Rn : ∀i,0 ≤ xi ≤ x∗} to itself. The result follows from Brouwer’s
Fixed Point Theorem.
We now proceed to study the game under two separate conditions: when subtitutabilities are
weak and when they are strong, i.e. the case of pure public goods.
4.1 Weak Substitutes
We deﬁne the complement network G = J−I−G, where J is the all-ones matrix, i.e., gij = 1−gij,
for all i  = j. In words, two vertices are linked in G if and only if they are not linked in G. We
write:
Σ = (1 + a)I + aG − aJ.
Suppose ﬁrst that −1 < a < 0. Solving for the Nash equilibrium is then equivalent to solving
LCP(− 1
1+ae,I + a
1+aG − a
1+aJ).
The solution can be equivalently written in terms of the Bonacich index of nodes on the com-
plement network.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a game on G where a < 0 and let G = J − I − G as before. There exists
a unique equilibrium if and only if −aλ1
￿
G
￿
< 1+a. Then, the equilibrium is unique, interior and
proportional to Bonacich, that is,
x∗
i =
1
1 + a + a
Pn
j=1 bj
￿
−a
1+a,G
￿bi
￿
−a
1 + a
,G
￿
, for all i = 1,...,n
Recall that we are dealing with the case −1 < a < 0. Notice that −aλ1
￿
G
￿
< 1+a is equivalent
to − 1
1+λ1(G) < a. Therefore, the interior unique equilibrium is obtained on − 1
1+λ1(G) < a < 0.
4.2 Public Goods
When substitutabilities are large, i.e. when a < − 1
1+λ1(G), the above transformations fail to work.
In these circumstances, agents’ free-riding on others’ contributions is severe enough that some
agents do not contribute at all. Equilibria are also no longer unique. In these cases, agents whose
equilibrium contribution levels are non-zero either contribute the optimum, (here 1), or some value
less than optimum. We call such equilibria corner and partially-corner, respectively.
Example 4.2. To ﬁx ideas, Figure 2 illustrates the contribution levels for 3 diﬀerent equilibria.
The left-most equilibrium is interior and is an equilibrium for a = −0.49, the graph in the middle
depicts a partially-corner equilibrium for a = −0.5, and the right-most graph shows a corner
equilibrium for a = −0.5. Recall that Figure 1 illustrates how the trajectory of equilibrium proﬁles
change with a and that a = −0.5 is the threshold at which equilibria become non-unique and below
which equilibria are non-interior. We remark that excluding isomorphisms, there are 9 diﬀerentFigure 2: Equilibrium contributions on local interaction graph.
equilibrium proﬁles that exist on the graph shown for a = −0.5 but only one corner proﬁle, namely
the one shown on the right.
4.2.1 Partially-Corner Equilibria
Precisely, a partially corner equilibrium proﬁle x∗ on the network G(v,e) is one such that there
exists some i,j ∈ v such that xi = 0 and 0 < xj < 1. We remark that equilibrium contributions of
non-corner agents, i.e. all agents j ∈ v such that 0 < xj < 1, is related to the Bonacich centrality
index on the subnetwork joining them:
Lemma 4.3. Let a < 0. Given a partially corner equilibrium proﬁle x on the network G(v,e), the
contribution levels of all nodes i such that 0 < xi < 1 is given by
x∗
i =
1
1 + a + a
Pn
j=1 bj
￿
−a
1+a,G′
￿bi
￿
−a
1 + a
,G′
￿
, for all i = 1,...,n
Proof. Remove all nodes i ∈ v (and their adjacent edges) such that xi = 0 since agents whose
contributions are zero are eﬀectively absent from the graph. Without loss of generality, consider
a single connected component G′ that remains. Note that contribution levels of all nodes in G
remain equilibrium strategies in G′. The equilibrium is interior, thereby unique, and Theorem 4.1
therefore holds.
4.2.2 Corner Equilibria
As mentioned earlier, when local substitutabilities are large, corner equilibria, with agents either
free-riding completely or contributing their maximum (1), also exist. For such a situation to be an
equilibrium, both free-riders and contributors must gain at doing so. When a ≤ −1, there is always
an equilibrium outcome where some agents exert all the eﬀort and others free-ride. Our proof for
this is constructive and provides a method to ﬁnd all corner equilibria in general graphs. We use
a concept from graph theory called maximal independent sets. Given the graph G = (v,e), let
NG(v′) designate the set of neighbours of node v′ ∈ v. We ﬁnd that all corner equilibria for a ≤ −1
are described by maximal independent sets of contributors.
Deﬁnition 4.4. An independent set S ⊆ v for G(v,e) is a set of nodes such that no node in the
set is adjacent to any other node in the set, i.e. ∀v′ ∈ S,
￿
￿NG(v′) ∩ S
￿
￿ = ∅.A maximal independent set is an independent set maximal for the inclusion. Put another way,
it is a set S such that every edge of the graph G has at least one endpoint not in S and every
vertex not in S has at least one neighbor in S.
Lemma 4.5. For a ≤ −1, there exists a corner equilibrium on the graph G.
Proof. We use the following properties of maximal independent sets. Given a maximal independent
set S every agent either belongs to S or is connected to an agent who belongs to S. To see this,
suppose not. Let S be a maximal independent set, and let i be an agent who does not belong toS
and is not connected to any agent who belongs to S. Then the set S ∪ {i} is an independent set,
and hence S is not maximal. Thus, we can partition the population into two disjoint sets of agents:
those who belong to maximal independent set S, and those who are linked to an agent in S. For
any agent i, there exists a maximal independent set S of the graph G such that i belongs to S. To
see this, note that i itself is an independent set. To build a maximal independent set, begin with i
and successively add agents not linked to i, then agents not linked to those agents, etc. Now note
that free-riders must be connected to at least one (non-zero) contributor to have strict incentives
not to contribute at all. Conversely, contributors cannot be connected to another contributor, as
otherwise they could substitute eﬀort levels with each other.
In the same way, when −1 < a ≤ − 1
1+λ1(G), complete free-riders need to be connected to
more than one contributor, because neighbors’ contributions are weighted by |a| < 1 and so do not
compensate exactly for one’s contributions. The following Theorem characterizes the structure of
corner equilibria in terms of independent sets with dominating constraints.
Deﬁnition 4.6. A set S ⊆ v is called a k-order maximal independent set if and only if it is a
maximal independent set such that each node not in the set is connected to at least k nodes in the
set, i.e. ∀v′  ∈ S,
￿ ￿NG(v′) ∩ S
￿ ￿ ≥ k.
Theorem 4.7. Let ⌈1/a⌉ be the smallest integer higher or equal than
￿ ￿1/a
￿ ￿. For a ≤ − 1
1+λ1(G), a
corner proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the set of contributing players, i.e.
￿
i ∈ v : xi =
1
￿
, is a ⌈1/a⌉-order maximal independent set of the graph G.
Maximal independent sets correspond to maximal independent sets of order 1. Every graph
has a maximal independent set, therefore there always exists a corner equilibrium for a ≤ −1.
However, for k ≥ 2, k-order maximal independent sets need not always exist. Therefore, when
−1 < a ≤ − 1
1+λ1(G), we may not have a corner equilibrium, though we may still have a partially
corner equilibrium. Recall that an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for all a ∈ R.
Consider a star, for example. There are two maximal independent sets, one composed by the
hub alone, the other composed by all the spokes. There is a single maximal independent set of
order k for 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 composed by all the spokes together.
Notice that there is a sense in which only least-well connected players contribute in a k−maximal
independent set, as in the star example above, as free-riders not in the set need to have many
connections with nodes in the set, so free riders need to be well-connected.
4.2.3 Stable Equilibria
We now show that corner equilibria are the only candidate stable equilibria to a perturbed best-
response procedure, thereby obviating the need to consider partially corner equilibria in our com-
putational results. The correspondence of corner equilibria to maximal independent sets of order kgives us insight into the computational complexity of computing equilibria under substitutabilities.
We report on this later in the paper.
We use a simple notion of stability based on Nash tˆ atonnement (e.g. Fudenberg 1991). We
use this concept because it applies directly to games with continuous action spaces, and because it
reduces the number of equilibria in our setting in a natural way. Deﬁne fi(x) as the best-response
of i to a proﬁle x and deﬁne f as the collection of thse individual best-responses f = (f1,...,fn). An
equilibrium x is stable if and only if there exists a positive number ρ > 0 such that for any vector ǫ
satisfying ∀i,|ǫi| ≤ ρ and xi+ǫi ≥ 0 the sequence x(n) deﬁned by x(0) = x+ǫ and x(n+1) = f(x(n))
converges to x.
This standard notion yields a strong result: only corner equilibria are stable. The result is
convenient because it help to mitigate the problem of multiple equilibria when a ≤ − 1
1+λ1(G),
where G is given as the complement of the network G, as before.
Theorem 4.8. For any network G, an equilibrium is stable if and only if it is a corner equilibrium.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that interior equilibria are not stable. At an interior equilibria, at least one
player choses a strictly positive action xi > 0 that is smaller than the individual optimal action
denoted x? (if he choses a zero action, this is not an interior equilibrium; if all players chose the
individual optimal action, they must be all isolated from each other for this action proﬁle to be an
equilibrium). Given an equilibrium proﬁle, denote by J the set of all such players, J  = ∅. Perturb
slightly the action of all the players in J by adding some positive number ρ > 0. If the perturbation
is small enough, ρ < minx∗ − xj : j ∈ J, the players in the neighborhood of J all best-respond by
decreasing their action. This further triggers an upwards rise of the action by players in J. These
best-response dynamics clearly diverge from the original equilibrium proﬁle. We now show that a
partially corner equilibria may be stable. Consider a partially corner equilibrium where zero action
players are connected to at least two non-zero action players. Perturb the action of all players by
some |ǫi| < x∗/n2. Then, direct computations show that the ensuing sequence of best-response
dynamics converge back to the original equilibrium.
The result is also powerful from a computational perspective, once we observe that the best
and worst equilibria, in the region where equilibria are non-unique, are described by maximal
independent sets (of order 1).
Lemma 4.9. For any network G, and a ≤ − 1
1+ρ(G) such that equilibria are non-unique, the
contribution-maximizing and contribution-minimizing stable equilibria are both described by maxi-
mal independent sets.
Proof. All stable equilibria in this region are described by maximal independent sets of order order
⌈1/a⌉. When a ≤ −1, these equilibria are maximal independent sets. The dominating constraints
become more stringent as a increases above −1, in turn reducing the number of admissible net-
works over which we conduct the search for contribution-maximizing and contribution-minimizing
networks.
Together, Theorem 4.8 and Lemma 4.9 provide us simpliﬁes how we study the tradeoﬀ between
contribution-maximizing and contribution-minimizing (equivalently utility-maximizing and utility-
minimizing) networks under substitutabilities, when equilibria are non-unique. While the problems
of ﬁnding the largest and the smallest maximal independent sets are both NP-hard, these are well-
studied problems and there are algorithms for computing both (e.g. Halld´ orsson et al. 1998, Gutin2004). We leverage this to solve for a graph’s contribution-maximizing (best-case) and contribution-
minimizing (worst-case) equilibria, across all a when equilibria are non-unique, together with the
annealing procedure described at the beginning of this section to search over the space of networks.
5 The Complexity of Equilibria
We have shown that in all cases, the equilibria of the contribution game are given by the solutions
to an associated LCP problem. This formulation, however, belies the complexity of both deciding
whether an equilibrium exists, and of solving for the equilibrium outcome.
For a > 0, equilibrium contribution levels are interior, unique, and given by the Bonacich indices
of nodes in the network; similarly for − 1
1+ρ(G) < a < 0, save that the Bonacich index is now on
the associated network of non-connections. In both cases, solving for the Nash equilibrium has
polynomial-time complexity.
When a ≤ − 1
1+ρ(G), we lose interiority and uniqueness of equilibria. As described in the last
section, when a ≤ − 1
1+ρ(G) corner equilibria are described by maximal independent sets of order
⌈1/a⌉ on the graph G. When a ≤ −1, these are maximal independent sets, which are guaranteed
to exist for all G. These are polynomial-time solvable3.
Lemma 5.1. Consider the game Σ with a ≤ −1. An equilibrium of the game is solvable in
polynomial time.
Proof. Theorem 4.7 establishes that corner equilibria are described by maximal independent sets.
Furthermore, the explication of existence of such a set in the Theorem provides an algorithm for
its construction that is clearly polynomial in n.
For the region where −1 < a < − 1
1+ρ(G) corner equilibria may not exist. As before, we focus on
these equilibria because they are the only candidate stable equilibria to a perturbed best-response
dynamic. Let k = ⌈1/a⌉. Deciding whether a corner equilibrium exists amounts to proving that an
independent sets of order k on G exists. When k ≥ 2, we have the following complexity on solving
for such equilibria.
Theorem 5.2. Let −1 < a < − 1
1+ρ(G). Deciding if a corner equilibrium of the associated game Σ
exists is NP-complete.
Proof. We omit the proof for reasons of brevity. The result is an NP-completeness reduction from
an independent set with domination constaints. We show that a maximal independent set of order
k corresponds to an independent set of vertices S ⊂ v,S  = ∅ with |S| ≥ min{r : r  ∈ {0,..,k − 1}
such that ∀v  ∈ S : |NG(v)∩S| ∈ {0,..,k−1}. The classiﬁcation of the problem of deciding whether
the latter sets as NP-complete is studied in Halld´ orsson et al. (1998).
We remark that when restricted to chordal graphs the k-independent set problem is always
solvable in polynomial time.
3Enumerating maximal independent sets or ﬁnding the smallest and largest of these remain NP-hard.6 Optimal Network Design
A number of edges e and vertices v are given. The problem of optimal network design consists on
arranging the v vertices with the e edges in such a way that some objective function is maximized.
We identify two diﬀerent network design problems.
Problem 1 Solve maxg{x∗(g,a) : g ∈ G(v,e)}.
Problem 2 Solve maxg{u(x∗(g,a)) : g ∈ G(v,e)}.
In the ﬁrst problem, the social planner wants to maximize aggregate activity (or contribution)
at equilibrium. In the second problem, the social planner wants to maximize aggregate equilibrium
welfare.
We study these problems in our game under complementarities and substitutabilities. When
the equilibria are unique, then these problems are well-posed, however when equilibria are non-
unique (when substitutabilities become too strong), we consider both the best case and worst case,
respectively contribution- or utility-maximizing and contribution- or utility-minimizing, equilibria
of networks. We study the relationship between the best-case and worst-case equilibria of a given
network, and particularly how contribution- or utility-maximizing networks in the best case perform
in the worst case, as well as how contribution- or utility-maximizing networks in the worst case
perform in the best case.
We present both analytical and computational results in this section. In our computational
experiments, the optimization process is performed using adaptive simulated annealing as described
by Allen (1995) and Tsallis et al. (1994). Starting from a given initial network conﬁguration,
random rewiring of individual links is performed, the objective function is evaluated and the change
is accepted with a certain probability that depends on a temperature coeﬃcient that allows the
system to escape local minima in the search space and vanishes to zero as the search results
become more certain. When the equilibrium is unique, the equilibrium is solved by computing the
associated Bonacich index of nodes, whereas when equilibria are non-unique, the equilibrium is
given by algorithms that compute the smallest and largest maximal independent sets . In all cases,
our characterization of the equilibria of the game helps us avoid solving the associated LCP.
6.1 Optimizing Under Complementarities
We ﬁrst consider the case when we have complementarities, i.e a > 0. We observe that prob-
lems 1 and 2 correspond to maximizing the L1 and L2 norms of the Bonacich index vector, i.e.
maxg{b(g,a)   1 : g ∈ G(v,e)} and maxg{u(x∗(g,a)) : g ∈ G(v,e)}, respectively. The correspon-
dence stems from the convenient relationship between utility and contribution quantities and the
Bonacich indices in our game, when the equilibrium is unique. The relation between Bonacich
centrality and the unique Nash equilibrium of our game under complementarities lends a geomet-
ric interpretation to Problem 1: namely, the social welfare-maximizing graph is the graph with
maximal weighted paths. For both problems, the relation suggests a way to characterize optimal
equilibria using spectral graph theory. We ﬁrst show that the two network design problems can be
reconciled in our game when the equilibrium is interior and unique. Speciﬁcally, we show that as
network complementarities grow, the two problems become asymptotically the same.
Lemma 6.1. Let g ∈ G(v,e), and λ1(G) its index. As a ↑ 1
λ1G, Problems 1 and 2 are equivalent
and reduce to:
max{λ1(g) : g ∈ G(v,e)}. (5).
Proof. For a given network g, b(g,a) is only well-deﬁned when a < 1/λ1(G). Therefore, the strict
upper bound for a in G(v,e) is 1/λ1(g∗), where g∗ is the solution. Then,
lim
a↑1/λ1(g∗)
b(g∗,a)   1 = lim
a↑1/λ1(g∗)
 b(g∗,a)  = +∞,
whereas
lim
a↑1/λ1(g∗)
b(g,a)   1, lim
a↑1/λ1(g∗)
 b(g,a)  ∈ O(1), when g  = g∗.
This drives the equivalence of Problems 1 and 2.
In words, when a is high enough, the networks that maximize aggregate outcome and welfare
coincide, and are given by the graph with maximal index.
We use results on graphs with largest maximal eigenvalues to solve the network design problem
in this case.
Let s1,v−1 (v ≥ 3) be the star with vertices 1,...,v and vertex 1 as hub. For 1≤ k ≤ v − 3, let
hv,k be the graph obtained from s1,v−1 by joining vertex 2 to vertices 3,...,k + 3.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose that a is high enough. Then,
(i) if e = v − 1, the unique solution to (3) is s1,v−1;
(ii) if e = v + k, k ∈ {0,1}, the unique solution to (3) is hv,k;
(iii) if e = v + 2, hv,k is a solution to (3), but it is not unique;
(iv) if e = v + k, k ≥ 2, there exists v(k) such that, for all v ≥ v(k), the unique solution to (3) is
hv,k.
Proof. See Theorem 3.3.2, page 68 in Cvetkovi´ c et al. (1997).
These asymptotic results reveal a great deal about how the optimal networks (for both objective
functions) change with the level of externalities. In the ﬁrst place, in simulation, we ﬁnd that L1
and L2-maximizing graphs always coincide, irrespective of a.
As explained earlier, it is the particular payoﬀ complementarities that ﬁx a and induce the
network linking players. Consider now the situation reversed: the payoﬀ complementarity between
two players i and j is set by two factors: the parameter a and the cumulative distance along all paths
in number of node hops between i and j in some graph g. By this view, we can now understand
that the relative network externalities are driving the system to have multiple equilibria and that
these increase either by increasing a or by increasing the largest eigenvalue in G. Moreover, the
above results suggest that both objective functions increase without bound as a ↑ 1/λ1(G). We
still treat a as an exogenous parameter that arises from the payoﬀ decomposition seen earlier. So
for all a, the optimal network g∗ is the graph on v and e with largest eigenvalue.
The left-hand plot in Figure 3 illustrates precisely this across a large range of a values, from
strong substitutabilities to strong complementarities, and for graphs with varying numbers of edges.
The graph shows that the ﬁrst eigenvalue of aggregate contribution- and utility-maximzing graphs
(L1- and L2-maximizing graphs in the case of a > 0) corresponds to the largest ﬁrst eigenvalue
possible for graphs with given v,e. In the region where a < 0 and equilibria are non-unique, the
value attributed to a graph is taken to be its best-performing (best-case) stable equilibrium. With1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
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Figure 3: The left-hand plot shows that the ﬁrst eigenvalue of aggregatecontribution- and utility-maximizing
equilibrium graphs corresponds to the largest ﬁrst eigenvalue possible given v and e across a wide range of
a. In the range where equilibria are non-unique, we choose the most favourable, i.e. best case, ’stable’
equilibrium performance of the graph. The right-hand ﬁgure plots the ﬁrst eigenvalue of graphs with best
worst-case stable equilibrium performance when equilibria are non-unique against the smallest ﬁrst eigenvalue
possible given v and e. Both plots refer to networks with varying number of edges while keeping v = 12 and
−3 < a < 0.5.
v and e ﬁxed, the largest eigenvalue of a graph is a measure of its regularity. A higher eigenvalue
corresponds to an irregular hub-like structure, whereas a lower eigenvalue (still for the same number
of vertics and edges) refers to a more regular network. We stress that the general trend remains
true irrespective of a.
6.2 Optimizing Under Substitutabilities
While interiority holds, as suggested by the left-hand plot in Figure 3, we still ﬁnd that aggregate
contribution- and utility-maximizing graphs coincide and that these networks are maximal index
graphs. When substitutabilities are strong enough, i.e. a grows negative enough, we lose interiority
and have both partially corner and corner equilibria. As discussed earlier, corner equilibria are
the only stable equilibria and so we only consider these. We now consider both the best-case and
worst-case equilibrium performance of networks in the case of non-unique equilibria.
Figure 4 illustrates the tension between optimal networks in the best and worst cases. Networks
that yield the highest contribution in the best case (among the set of its equilibria) also exhibit
the worst worst case performance. We ﬁnd that these networks are maximal index graphs, which
are also optimizing networks when the equilibria is unique. On the other hand, networks that
yield the best worst case performance are minimal index graphs, i.e. graphs with the smallest
ﬁrst eigenvalue. This is illustrated in the right-hand plot of Figure 3. Minimal index graphs also
exhibit the smallest spread between best and worst case equilibrium performance, as illustrated in
the right-hand plot of Figure 4.
6.3 Excluding the Key Player: A Network-Based Policy
We concluded the last section by showing that under substitutabilities and when equlibria are non-
unique, the geometry of networks with best equilibrium performance also have worst worst-caseperformance, whereas those networks with best worst-case performance are far from optimal in the
best case. These networks correspond to maximal and minimal index graphs, respectively.
Now, we brieﬂy investigate a network-based policy aimed at mitigating this discrepancy be-
tween best- and worst-case equilibrium performance. We provide a simple geometric criterion to
identify the target in the population when the planner wishes to increase optimally the aggregate
group outcome. We denote by G−i (respectively Σ−i) the new adjacency matrix (respectively
the matrix of cross-eﬀects), obtained from G (respectively from Σ) by setting to zero all of its
i-th row and column coeﬃcients. The resulting network is g−i. More formally, we want to solve
maxi∈N{x∗(Σ−i)−x∗(Σ)}, where N is the population of agents. The is equivalently expressed as:
max
i∈N
x∗(Σ−i) (6)
This is a ﬁnite optimization problem, that admits at least one solution. We ﬁnd that a good
heuristic for the solution of this problem is the the removal of the highest degree node. Recalling
that the best-case and worst-case stable equilibria in the range where equilibria are non-unique
are described by maximal independent sets, every edge imposes a dominating constraint on the
independent set construction, and so a node with highest degree imposes the largest number of
constraints. Furthermore, barring the case where multiple nodes share the highest degree, such a
node is excluded from the maximal independent set of contributors in the best case equilibria and is
included in the set in the worst case. Note that the policy of excluding the key player will improve
the network’s performance in the worst case, without decreasing its best-case performance4.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the star with n − 1 spokes. This graph has 2 maximal independent sets.
The (best case) equilibrium highest aggregate contribution is described by all spokes contributing (a
value of 1) and the hub free-riding completely. The worst case equilibrium is described by the hub
being the only contributor. Removing the hub node from the graph leads to no change in aggregate
contribution in the best case and completely reconciles the best and worst case outcomes: each
node always contributes optimally.
The right-hand plot in Figure 4 illustrates the eﬀectiveness of this policy in reconciling best-
and worst- case equilibrium performance. The plot shows that worst-case performance of graphs
can be dramatically improved and even match best-case performance when the network graph is
sparse. As the graph becomes more dense, this policy becomes less eﬀective.
6.4 Rearranging Network Links: A Network-Based Policy
Armed with an understanding of the network pattern of externalities that lead to the most eﬃcient
equilibrium outcomes, the system planner can now prescribe changes to the given graph that
maximize its largest eigenvalue. One possible mechanism might be to induce a rearrangement of
the network edges, keeping the number of nodes ﬁxed. We explore the limits of this approach for
the case where a > 0.
Theorem 6.3. Starting from a sparse random graph g(v,p), where p is the probability of an edge
between any two players i and j, i  = j, the largest eigenvalue can be increased as much as O(
√
e).
Proof. We omit the full proof for reasons of space. Brieﬂy, consider a connected simple graph g and
let λ1 be its largest eigenvalue. Let di, i ∈ V , denote the degree of a vertex i and let ∆ = maxi∈V di.
(If g is regular then di = ∆ for each i ∈ V , then λ1 = ∆.) If g is not regular, the there is no graph
4Aggregate equilibrium contribution or welfare will only be adversely aﬀected as complementarities increase.0 100 200 300 400 500 600
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Figure 4: The left-hand plot shows the spread in aggregate equilibrium contribution, i.e. the diﬀerence in
aggregate contribution for the best- and worst-case equilibria, for graphs with the best best-case and best
worst-case performance, ﬁxing a such that equilibria are non-unique, for v = 15(blue/dash),25(black/dot−
dash),35(red/solid), and varying e. The right-hand plot shows the best-case and worst-case equilibrium
performance of graphs with best worst-case performance (blue / dot-dash) compared to graphs with best
best-case performance (red / solid), for v = 12, a such that equilibria are non-unique. Note that best best-
case performing graphs have worst worst-case performance. The black / dash curve plots the the worst-case
performance of graphs with the key player removed, starting from the best best-case performing graphs (red
/ solid).
such that ∆ − 1
2n(n∆−1)∆2 ≤ λ1 < ∆. See Stevanovic (2004) for the proof of this upper bound. In
either case, however, λ1 = O(e).
Fixing the number of vertices, it is clear that the greatest diﬀerence in ﬁrst eigenvalue lies
in a graph with fewer edges. Consider a sparse random graph, where g(v,p) and e =
pv(v−1)
2 .
It can be shown that the maximum eigenvalue of this graph λ
′
1 is almost surely the following:
λ
′
1 = (1 + O(1))
√
∆, where the O(1) term tends to zero as
√
∆ gets large.
Putting the two results together, we have the maximum increase in ﬁrst eigenvalue by any
manipulation of edges starting from a random graph, λ1
λ
′
1
, to be bounded by O(
√
e).
Corollary 6.4. Starting from a random graph, ﬁxing v and e, the gains in aggregate welfare or
aggregate contribution from manipulating the graph to achieve an optimal equilibrium (with respect
to either objective) is O(
√
e).
The interpretation of Theorem 6.3 is that the network designer’s task of manipulating the graph
will induce a change in ﬁrst eigenvalue of size at most O(
√
e) and that this diﬀerence reduces as
the network becomes more dense, i.e. edges are added.
As to the gains from such manipulation (Corollary 6.4), consider the example of a small enough
so that the optimal graph is the one with largest eigenvalue. At a ﬁrst order in a, the Bonacich
index of i is bi = 1 + adi, and so aggregate equilibrium is v + 2ae. The square of i’s Bonacich
index is 1 + 2adi, and social welfare is v + 4ae. The largest eigenvalue increase is of the order of √
e. The optimal graph is such that the inverse of the largest eigenvalue equals a. Therefore, both
the aggregate equilibrium and the social welfare increase for the optimal graph are roughly of the
order of
√
e. In other words, the gains from random to optimally designed network are marginally
decreasing as O(
√
e). Symmetrically, welfare losses in random versus optimal networks are sizeable,
and the smaller the larger the network.That the greatest gains from manipulating the network coincide with smaller networks (where
such an approach may be easier to implement), preliminarily suggests the viability of the network
designer’s task. On the other hand, it also shows that a network designer is very limited in his
capacity to aﬀect the outcome on a large graph in this way, i.e. keeping e and v ﬁxed.
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